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State Health Care Reforms
LIGHTING THE WAY OR STOKING THE FIRE?
BY DENNIS HEFFLEY AND 
RAYMOND SALANI III
“I recently became a Christian Scientist.  
It was the only health plan I could 
afford.”   ~Betsy Salkind
Frustrated by the federal govern-
ment’s failure to reduce the “unin-
sured” problem and to slow the rise 
in health care spending and insur-
ance premiums, individual states 
have adopted or proposed various 
health care reforms.  State initiatives 
may offer fertile testing grounds for 
national policy changes, but this time 
round they may be fueling the flames 
they’re meant to quench. 
 State reforms generally rest on 
the premise that health insurance has 
deteriorated.  More uninsureds, larger 
out-of-pocket payments by patients, 
and insurers’ denial of claims are cited 
as evidence.  However genuine the 
evidence may be, it doesn’t imply that 
insurance now covers a lower fraction 
of total health care spending than in 
years past.  In fact, the reverse holds: 
insurance now covers a larger share of 
health care spending, in total and for 
specific categories of health care, than 
ever before.  Moreover, economic anal-
ysis suggests that further expanding 
coverage through employer mandates, 
individual mandates, purchasing pools, 
or other state reforms, could make 
matters worse, rather than providing 
a silver-bullet solution to the elusive 
“health care crisis.”
A ENDURING CRISIS?
  Economists Judith and Lester Lave 
have written that: “There is a pervasive 
feeling of imminent crisis with respect 
to the delivery of medical services 
in the United States.  Expenditures 
on medical care are rising without 
any offsetting decline in our mortal-
ity rates—which compare poorly with 
those of many other countries.  The 
costs of medical care are increasing at 
an accelerating rate.”  
Though contemporary in its tone, 
the Laves’ comments actually were 
penned nearly 40 years ago. And they 
knew, even then, that any “crisis” had 
more to do with the predictable effects 
of insurance than with a failing health 
care system.  The standard model of 
an insured health care market (see box 
on page 16) predicts that more cover-
age—a lower coinsurance rate, or the 
fraction paid out-of-pocket—increases 
demand and boosts total health care 
spending because both the (gross) price 
and quantity of care increase.  The 
amount demanded by consumers at 
every price increases because their out-
of-pocket (net) price falls.  Out-of-
pocket spending may rise or fall if the 
percentage increase in quantity is larger 
or smaller than the percentage decrease 
in the out-of-pocket price. 
  What happened to each of the 
variables in this analysis since 1960?   
Rows 1-6 of the table show each of 
the variables by 10-year intervals from 
1960 to 2000, and for 2005, the latest 
available figures.  The average coinsur-
ance rate (c) for personal health care 
(row 1) fell from 0.55 in 1960 to 0.15 
in 2005.  So, insurance—private or 
public—covered 85% of all U.S. per-
sonal health care spending in 2005, 
something that would surprise many 
Europeans, who commonly believe that 
Americans pay a large portion of health 
care costs directly out of pocket.   
 Total spending (PQ), in unad-
justed dollars, rose from $23.32 billion 
in 1960 to $1.66 trillion in 2005 (row 
2).  This 71.2-fold spending growth—
nearly 10% per year over the 45-year 
period—is the product of a 14.5-fold 
increase in health care prices (row 3) 
and a nearly 5-fold increase in the 
quantity of care consumed (row 4). 
The reduction in the coinsurance 
rate (c) shielded consumers quite a bit 
from health care inflation: the out-of-
pocket or net price (cP) rose from 0.55 
to 2.17, a 3.9-fold increase (row 5).   
But, with both cP and Q increasing, 
out-of-pocket spending (cPQ) posted 
a 19.4-fold increase over the period 
(row 6), or about 6.8% per year.  So, 
over time, the public has paid increas-
ingly large sums out-of-pocket, but 
the increase has reflected rising prices 
and greater consumption, not a reduc-
tion in insurance coverage.  Indeed, an 
expansion of coverage (a lower c) is an 
important source of the increases in the 
price and quantity of care.
  In fact, consumers were even more 
insulated from the inflationary effects 
of health insurance than the above 
Average Ratio
Annual of 2005
ROW: VARIABLE: YEAR: 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 % Change to 1960
1 Coinsurance Rate (c) 0.55 0.40 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.15 -2.85 0.3
2 Personal Health Care Spending (PQ); $b 23.320 62.943 215.331 607.471 1139.855 1661.372 9.94 71.2
3 Gross Price (P); 1960=1 1.00 1.52 3.36 7.30 11.70 14.49 6.12 14.5
4 Consumption (Q) 23.320 41.283 64.111 83.210 97.465 114.631 3.60 4.9
5 Out-of-Pocket or Net Price (cP) 0.55 0.60 0.91 1.64 1.98 2.17 3.09 3.9
6 Out-of-Pocket Spending (cPQ) 12.873 24.925 58.570 136.074 192.635 249.206 6.81 19.4
7 Other Prices (P0); 1960=1 1.00 1.30 2.74 4.26 5.54 6.25 4.16 6.2
8 Real Gross Price (P/P0); 1960=1 1.00 1.17 1.23 1.71 2.11 2.32 1.89 2.3
9 Real Net Price (cP/P0) 0.55 0.47 0.33 0.38 0.36 0.35 -1.02 0.6
HAVE REDUCTIONS IN THE REAL OUT-OF-POCKET PRICE OF CARE INCREASED 
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numbers might suggest.  Over the 
period 1960-2005, the prices of non-
medical or “other goods” (Po) also 
increased (row 7), but substantially 
less rapidly than medical prices (row 
3).  Thus, the real (or relative) price of 
health care (P/Po) more than doubled 
over the period (row 8).  But, recall 
that the fraction paid out-of-pocket 
(c) was falling.  So the real net price, 
or the out-of-pocket price relative to 
other prices (cP/Po, in row 9), actually 
fell 27%, from 0.55 in 1960 to 0.35 in 
2005—a fact that would raise foreign 
eyebrows even higher.  
  The decline in the real net price 
over time explains part of the growth in 
health care consumption (Q), as shown 
in the scatter plot of the two variables.   
Even though the real net price of care 
leveled off, consumption continued to 
grow, due to growth in population and 
real income, new medical technologies, 
and other factors.  A simple regression 
model of the effects of the real net price 
and per capita real income on per cap-
ita consumption of health care shows 
that a 10% reduction in the real net 
price is associated with a 4.9% increase 
in consumption per capita, while a 
10% increase in per capita real income 
is associated with a 9.1% increase in 
consumption per capita.
  The lesson?  Individual consump-
tion of health care is more responsive 
to out-of-pocket payments and income 
than many policymakers seem to think.   
This has important implications for 
the capacity of state health care reforms 
to solve a 45-year-old problem, since 
many of the reforms seek to further 
extend coverage and thereby lower out-
of-pocket payments.
STATE REFORMS
 Like the “crisis” they seek to 
address, state health care reforms are 
not new.  Since at least the 1970s, 
states have experimented with various 
ways to extend coverage or control 
costs.  Hawaii, for example, ventured 
down the road of employer mandates 
in 1974.  The Prepaid Health Act 
required most employers to provide 
health insurance to employees and 
capped the employee’s premium con-
tribution at 1.5% of earnings.  With 
these and subsequent efforts to pro-
vide more complete coverage, Hawaii 
reduced the percentage uninsured, but 
its average for 2004-2006 remained 
about 8.6%, roughly the same as in 
Minnesota (8.5%), Iowa (9.3%), and 
Maine (9.5%).  Connecticut’s rate was 
10.4%, similar to figures posted by 
other New England states.  Florida 
(20.3%), New Mexico (21.0%), and 
Texas (24.1%) posted the highest rates, 
all well above the national figure of 
15.3%. 
  Maryland, another early player in 
the health care reform game, adopted 
price-regulation, requiring hospitals to 
charge uniform prices to all payers 
and limiting discounts to managed 
care organizations (MCOs), ostensibly 
to avoid “cost-shifting” to other pay-
ers.  Predictably, discounts to public 
health care programs were allowed 
to exceed discounts to MCOs.  In 
1994, Maryland also introduced a 
Comprehensive Standard Health 
Benefit Plan that required insurers to 
offer a plan with pre-specified benefits 
to smaller firms (< 50 workers), at a 
premium not to exceed a fixed percent-
age of Maryland’s average wage.
  In an effort to increase access to 
Medicaid, even if it resulted in less 
complete coverage, the Oregon Health 
Plan adopted a rationing mechanism 
to control utilization and program 
costs.  Essentially the plan uses a 
formula based on effectiveness, cost, 
and perceived community value to 
prioritize medical procedures.  Within 
a predetermined state Medicaid bud-
get, only procedures ranked sufficiently 
high are covered.  
  The more recent and much-her-
alded Massachusetts Plan seeks to elim-
inate the “uninsured problem” by an 
individual mandate—requiring unin-
sured persons to purchase coverage.  If 
this seems a little harsh, overly simple, 
and too much like auto insurance, rest 
assured that the state also has estab-
lished premium subsidies for poorer 
When insurance coverage expands, 
consumers’ out-of-pocket share of 
the price, or coinsurance rate c, 
declines from c = 1 (no insurance) 
to some c < 1 (partial coverage).   
As a result, the effective demand 
increases, rotating upward from Du 
(uninsured) to Di (insured). This 
boosts the gross price of care, from 
Pu to Pi, as well as the quantity of 
care consumed, from Qu to Qi.  The 
net price to consumers falls from 
Pu to cPi.  Total spending rises 
from PuQu to PiQi, but out-of-pock-
et spending (cPiQi) may decrease 
or increase, depending on whether 
the percentage reduction in cPi is 
larger or smaller than the percent-
age increase in Q.  In the extreme 
case of full coverage (c = 0), the 
demand curve becomes vertical (Df), 
consumers are completely insensi-
tive to the market price of care, and 
the quantity demanded under full 
insurance (Qf) is the amount that 
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households and fines for employers that 
do not cover their employees, along 
with state tax penalties for those who 
fail to comply.  California, Colorado, 
and New Mexico also have been wres-
tling with the thorny details and politi-
cal pitfalls of individual mandates, as 
well as other means of achieving more 
universal coverage.
  Connecticut has opted to build 
its reforms on existing mechanisms—
expanding the state’s HUSKY plan to 
ensure enrolment of all newborns and 
school-age children who lack other 
sources of insurance, and a new Charter 
Oak Health Plan that seeks to provide 
affordable coverage to adults (19-64) 
who have no employer-based or pub-
lic coverage.  Instead of an individual 
mandate, the plan seeks to encourage 
coverage through premium subsidies, 
eliminating restrictions on pre-exist-
ing conditions, lower co-payments for 
preventive services, and so on.
  Some state initiatives have focused 
on cost-cutting mechanisms—ration-
ing, competition, or price controls—
but, in response to concerns about 
the uninsured problem, many of the 
past and current state reforms have 
tried to extend or enrich coverage for 
certain groups.  As laudable as these 
efforts may be, expansion of coverage 
in almost any form is likely to fuel the 
fires of health care inflation.  This, in 
turn, makes it all the more difficult 
to achieve more complete coverage at 
affordable rates.   
ANOTHER VIEW
 As national data show, more 
complete coverage has contributed to 
higher prices, greater consumption of 
services, and rapid increases in health 
care spending—all consistent with a 
simple market model of the effects of 
insurance.  Until we recognize these 
linkages and system-level effects of 
more coverage, efforts at health care 
reform are more likely to extend the 
health care “crisis” than to relieve the 
dual problems of expensive care and 
covering the uninsured. 
 Health care will become more 
affordable only when we have stronger 
personal incentives to use it prudently.   
Such incentives are neither fanciful 
nor difficult to implement, and work-
ing examples have been around for 
several decades (see p.4 at: http://
cteconomy.uconn.edu/TCE_Issues/
January_1994.pdf).  
A well-designed program should not 
only encourage but also reward health-
ier lifestyles, avoidance of unnecessary 
risks, wise use of care, knowledge of 
what a procedure or medication actu-
ally costs (not just the fixed co-pay-
ment), and questioning of providers 
about unnecessary services and inap-
propriate fees.  
If you don’t think such incentives 
are lacking, ask yourself if you know 
(or even care about) the gross price 
of your last visit to the physician, 
your last routine dental check-up, or 
your last prescription drug.  If you 
have health insurance, you likely won’t 
know or much care.  Such ignorance 
and ambivalence are not irrational, just 
very costly to all of us.






























AS THE REAL OUT-OF-POCKET PRICE 
HAS FALLEN, CONSUMPTION OF 
HEALTH CARE HAS INCREASED
(1960-2005)
Health Care Consumption (Q)
Health care will become 
more affordable only 
when we have stronger 
personal incentives to 
use it prudently.
SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy, based on data from the National 
Health Expenditure Accounts and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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